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The current agricultural marketing literature has considerable controversy about the
optimal use of hedging for farmers. Much of this literature has very limited data on farmer
behavior and an evaluation of the outcome of this behavior. This paper uses data from a hedging
game from Maryland marketing clubs for 1994-1998. Hypotheses concerning the consistency of
farmer behavior with the research literature on hedging are considered. Results indicate that
farmers do not achieve price enhancement from hedging. However, their decisions do not
conform to implications of optimal hedging models in a number of dimensions. This analysis
provides further information to help bridge the gap between academic research and practical
hedging.
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Decreased government intervention in commodity markets has created greater price risk
for farmers in recent years. With a heightened exposure to price variability, farmers have been
expected to use forward pricing markets, like futures and options, to manage this risk.  At the
same time, agricultural economists have shown a renewed interest in the topic of price risk
management. Although this topic has no shortage of applied research studies, it would appear
that this methodology has failed to meet the needs of applied practitioners and ultimately
farmers.  From surveys, we have learned that extension economists believe published risk
management research is of little relevance to real world applications (Anderson and Mapp) and
there is a sharp difference of opinion between extension and research marketing economists
when it comes to the motives for farmer forward pricing (Parcell, et al.).
Close inspection of the forward pricing literature yields two prevailing opinions among
agricultural economists. The most commonly held view in the literature is that futures markets
are efficient, and farmers are unlikely to consistently profit in the futures market (Zulauf and
Irwin). Risk aversion becomes the primary motive for farmers to use forward markets and a
considerable amount of research is devoted to determining optimal hedging rules. Much of this
research suggests that farmers should forward price a relatively high proportion of their crop
(usually over 70 percent) in forward markets (Peck; Kahl; Myers and Thompson). However, it
seems that this prescription is seldom followed in real world settings as surveys show
significantly less hedging among farmers (Patrick, Musser and Eckman; Goodwin and
Schroeder). Although production risk may be one cause for lower hedging (Grant), Patrick,
Musser and Eckman found that this was not an important issue for farmers as compared to other
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issues (e.g., credit constraints and margin calls). In contrast, that same survey showed that the
majority of farmers believe that forward markets present an opportunity to achieve better prices.
This latter view is consistent with a smaller segment of the literature that suggests
farmers can use forward markets to achieve higher prices. This approach considers forward
pricing as a way to profit from the forward markets implying that farmers may have more
accurate expectations about prices than those portrayed in the forward market. Research in this
area has investigated forward pricing strategies that will work in certain market conditions;
Wisner, Blue and Baldwin is a recent example of this view.
Whether forward pricing strategies are used by farmers to enhance prices or to manage
risk is a debate that will likely continue. However, a common problem in the forward pricing
literature is the lack of evidence on farmers’ use of forward pricing markets. Before applied
research in this area can be improved, we need to observe their forward pricing decisions so that
we may better understand how farmers form price expectations (Brorsen and Irwin). Although
some information is available from farmer surveys, it is difficult to conduct detailed tests on the
basis of one-time surveys.
This study examines farmer forward pricing decisions from a marketing game conducted
during 1994-1998. Farmers in Maryland grain marketing clubs participate in a Model Farm
exercise, which is a real-time marketing simulation that allows for paper transactions in forward
markets over the marketing season. Unlike other studies that utilize survey data at one point in
time, these data allow us to study farmer forward pricing behavior over several years and within
marketing seasons. Analysis of these data allows us to consider whether farmers use forward
markets to manage price risk or enhance prices. The next section of the paper discusses the data5
from the grain marketing clubs while the third section delineates hypotheses to be considered.
The fourth section of the paper provides the results.
Description of Data
A grain marketing club is a group of farmers and agribusiness personnel that discuss
marketing strategies and outlook. Clubs are usually associated with the Cooperative Extension
Service with agricultural marketing specialists and extension agents providing educational
training on the marketing process. In Maryland, the educational component is enhanced through
a practical marketing exercise called the Model Farm. The Model Farm is a hypothetical 1,000-
acre farm with 600 acres of corn, 200 acres of soybeans and 200 acres of wheat. Crop yields are
the same for every club and are assumed to be constant so production risk does not enter into
pricing decisions. Club participants make joint marketing decisions for the Model Farm at their
meetings, which usually occur once every two weeks. The Model Farm serves as an exercise in
understanding how the marketing tools will perform in actual farm situations. Farmers make
decisions about when to price, how much to price, and what tool (cash sale, forward contract,
futures contract or options contract) to use. No transactions costs are assumed for futures and
options trades, and no constraints are placed on margin balances. At the end of each year,
marketing clubs turn in their trading records. These records describe the date, size, and type of
transactions made throughout the marketing year.
1 Between 1994 and 1998, nine clubs
participated in the Model Farm trading exercise.  However, three of the clubs only participated
                                                       
1 Certainly, decisions made in a game setting may not be consistent with actual behavior.  However, applications of
experimental economics have shown that the behavior of the participants often mirror the behavior expected from
economic agents (Fackler and McNew). While we recognize the inherent limitations in associating Model Farm
trading behavior with actual trading behavior, the data is a reasonably good proxy for understanding expectations
and forward pricing behavior. In fact, ignoring the realities of production risk and financial considerations allows us
to examine the relationships between forward pricing behavior and price expectations.6
for one year, so they are excluded from the analysis. Table 1 lists the six remaining marketing
clubs and the years that they participated in the Model Farm exercise.
To simplify the analysis, we consider only the transactions for corn during the pre-harvest
pricing window. This time period is from January (prior to planting) until harvest time in
November. Figure 1 shows the mid-month price for the December corn futures contract over the
five marketing years included in the analysis. As can be seen, forward prices varied substantially
not only in terms of their level from one year to the next but also in terms of seasonal pattern,
implying that any routine hedging strategy would have led to significant variation in hedging
profits. In 1994 and 1998, the forward price fell consistently and bottomed at harvest time. In
1995, the reverse trend occurred as the forward price rose throughout the season and reached a
high at harvest. In 1996 and 1997, high and low prices, respectively were posted during the
summer.
Each club has 60,000 bushels of corn production that may be priced through forward
contracts for 1,000 bushels or exchanged-traded futures and options contracts for 5,000 bushels.
Although the clubs use forward contracts for local markets, we base all cash forward prices on
the December futures price on the date when a contract is entered, which assumes that the basis
was constant. In addition to forward contracts, clubs may use futures contracts, call options, or
put options to forward price their corn, which are also based on the December contract.
2 A
complication for analyzing how much has been hedged concerns the use of options. For example,
a $2.50 put option provides different price protection than a $2.00 put option. Similarly, 5,000
bushels that are priced with a futures contract at $2.50 is different than pricing 5,000 bushels
                                                       
2 Some clubs utilize contract months other than the December month for the purposes of storage or because of early
harvest decisions. Therefore, we have taken the liberty of converting all non-December contracts into December
contracts. For example, if a club takes a short futures position for September 1995 corn on March 31, 1995, we have
instead changed their position to short a December 1995 contract on the same date. With options, if a club buys a7
with a $2.50 put option. We make use of a delta value of an option to determine how much price
protection is offered through a certain option position. The option’s delta measures the change in
the option premium from a one-unit change in the underlying futures price.
3 For put options, the
delta value is in the range of  [-1,0] while for call options the range is [0,1]. A short futures
position has a delta value of –1. Because forward contracts are simply futures contracts that
cannot be offset, they too have a delta of -1. An option’s delta value will change depending on
two main factors. First the strike price of the option relative to the underlying futures price is a
key component. With declining futures prices, the delta for a put option will increase in absolute
value, and the delta for a call option will decrease. Indeed, arbitrage guarantees that a call option
and a put option with the same strike price will have delta values that sum to 1 in absolute value.
4
The second factor that influences an option’s delta is the length of time until expiration.
In the extreme case when the option is at expiration, a call (put) option’s delta will be either 0 or
1 (-1) depending on whether the option has intrinsic value. Prior to expiration, an option’s delta
will be somewhere in between these values depending on the time until expiration and the
relationship between the futures price and strike price.
Using the concept of an option’s delta, it now becomes straightforward to add-up
positions in forward, futures, and options contracts. For each club throughout the five-year
period, we construct a delta-weighted hedge ratio, which is the quantity-weighted sum of each
portfolio instrument. As an example of how this computation is made, consider a portfolio that
                                                                                                                                                                                  
March 270 put option when the March futures price is 280, then we convert this transaction to a December put
option that is 10-cents out-of-the-money.
3 If futures prices are log-normal, then Black (1976) has shown how to compute the value of an option given the
standard deviation of the price distribution. Alternatively, one can compute the market's implied volatility from
observed option premiums and the delta of an option measures the change in the option value based on a change in
the futures price.
4 A conceptual proof of this argument can be made by showing that a synthetic futures position can be created from
a portfolio of a put and call option with the same strike price. For example, a synthetic long futures position is8
consists of 10,000 bushels forward contracted, 10,000 bushels of a $2.50 put option and 5,000
bushels of a $2.80 call option. With delta values of  –1.00, -0.50, and +0.20, the weighted-delta
position sums to –14,000 bushels. Following the normal convention of reporting a positive
number for the hedge ratio, the 14,000 bushels divided by total production of 60,000 bushels
gives a ratio of 0.23.
Study Hypotheses
Traditional hedging theory would suggest that each year farmers forward price a
proportion of their crop, known as the hedge ratio. Empirical studies on grains suggest that the
hedge ratio is in the range of 0.85 to 1.00 without yield uncertainty (Myers and Thompson); the
ratio drops to about 0.55 to 0.90 with yield uncertainty (McNew), which depends on the extent of
yield variability and correlation between yields and prices. Under the model assumptions,
forward pricing is purely risk reducing because farmers believe forward prices are unbiased.  At
a minimum, we would expect to see a high proportion of the crop forward priced if farmers
followed this rule. Furthermore, hedging theory would suggest that the amount forward priced
does not change over time. The above reasoning suggests several hypotheses for this analysis:
(1) All clubs should forward price a high proportion of their crop (approximately 85-100%) each
year.
(2) The hedge ratio should not vary over years based on past price relationships or current price
expectations.
(3) The hedge ratio should be established at planting and not vary over the growing season.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
created from a long call option and short put option with the same strike price. Therefore, the delta of the portfolio is
dc-dp which equals the delta of the long futures position (+1).9
The alternative view that forward pricing increases prices received and perhaps also
decreases risk is more ad-hoc than the above reasoning and is therefore not as easy to summarize
into hypotheses. However, the presumption is that farmers can identify pricing opportunities that
increase price received through the growing season. Thus, we would expect the reverse of the
above hypotheses. The amount forwarded priced will vary throughout the marketing season and
perhaps from one year to the next. If this is true, then an interesting question is what information
influences farmers forward pricing decisions?  For example, under an adaptive expectations
view, farmers current price expectations should be strongly influenced by price levels in the
previous year. If current prices are below these expectations, farmers will wait for better
opportunities, which presumably will arise in the future. Thus, one would expect less hedging if
prices are lower than in the previous year and more if prices are higher.
Results
Although one of the main benefits of hedging is to reduce price risk, an empirically
important question is whether farmers have the ability to consistently profit from their forward
pricing decisions. Based on our discussion earlier, the literature has no resounding answer to this
question. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to explore whether our set of farmers participating in
marketing clubs can consistently profit from forward pricing. Table 2 presents the average
forward pricing profits by year and for the full sample from 1994-98. Forward pricing profits
represent the difference between the net-price received for corn in each year less the harvest-time
price. These profits account for all transactions through forward, futures and options contracts.
For comparison, the last column of table 2 shows the change in the December futures price
between May and November. A positive number indicates that the forward price was lower at
harvest time in November as compared to planting time in May. Stated another way, a farmer10
who routinely hedged his entire production in May would have on average received a 16.5-cent
higher price than by selling corn at harvest.
As a group, the clubs made positive profits in 1994, 1996 and 1998 which were years
when prices were lower at harvest as compared to early in the season, making any pre-harvest
pricing strategies profitable. In contrast, 1995 was a year when prices rose consistently
throughout the marketing year and were highest at harvest with a 90-cent difference between the
harvest price and the seasonal low. Not surprisingly, the clubs earned negative profits, which
were statistically different from zero. In 1997, the harvest-time price was roughly the same as the
price in the early spring, after bottoming in the summer. Thus, the clubs on average showed a
small loss. For the entire time period, forward pricing profits are positive at 10.5 cents, but not
statistically greater than zero.
The results indicate that the marketing clubs participating in this study did not
consistently beat the market or earn statistically significant profits over the five-year period from
forward pricing.  Thus, these results support the efficient market hypothesis. However, it is
important to note that the sample size limits the generality of this conclusion. Although we have
numerous clubs on which to base the tests, only five marketing years were available. With more
marketing years, the results may differ.
Figure 2 depicts the variation in the delta-weighted hedge ratios by season and by year
for the sample. This graph, which shows the average over all clubs in the sample, illustrates
several points. First, the club's appear to have a strong seasonal tendency to hedge less in the
spring and more in the summer. Second, it would appear that the amount hedged is significantly
less than what is prescribed by hedging theory. The peak amount hedged by the average club is
around 0.65, with a more normal level somewhere around 0.5. In 1997, the maximum hedged11
was about 0.30. Finally, there appears to be annual variation in the proportion hedged. For
example, in 1995 and 1997 the clubs forward priced less as compared to the other three years.
All of these characteristics do not support the optimal hedge hypotheses which implies
that amounts hedged would be nearly 0.9 for all years and that farmers would reach this hedge
level at planting. Instead, it appears that farmer forward pricing behavior is more complex than
traditional hedging theory would suggest. Given that hedging behavior appears to be dynamic,
and not myopic or static, we now consider whether these decisions are influenced by observable
factors.
To determine what influences hedging behavior, we begin by estimating a seasonal
model of the form:
(1) ￿ ￿ + + + =
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where Hkt is the proportion of the crop forward priced in month k of year t;; Mk is a set of
seasonal dummy variables and Yt is a set of yearly dummy variables. Two seasonal dummy
variables are used, one for the pre-planting period of January-April and the second during the
critical growing season of May-July. The intercept accounts for the case of August-November
1996. Because Hkt can take on a value of zero, we use a tobit model for estimation of a truncated
model. Although in principle Hkt could be unity, no clubs ever achieve that level so we do not
account for the upper bound. Both a pooled model, which includes all clubs, and a model for
each individual club is estimated. The pooled model can be viewed as a restriction that all clubs
have similar forward pricing behavior.
Parameter estimates from equation (1) are given in table 3. The results highlight several
key points. First, if clubs were purely risk-minimizers one would expect all of the seasonal
coefficients to be zero so that there is no difference across years or within the marketing season.12
Given the significance of the annual dummy variables, it is clear that the clubs systematically
changed their pricing behavior from one year to the next. As compared to the base of 1996, two
clubs hedged significantly more in 1994 while one club hedged significantly less. In 1995, three
clubs hedged significantly less while two clubs hedged significantly more as compared to 1996.
Likewise, in 1997 and 1998 the participating clubs had significantly different hedging when
compared to 1996. Within a marketing year, there seems to be little systematic variation in
hedging levels after May. In fact, only Talbot County showed a significantly different coefficient
for the May-July period which shows significantly less hedging during this period as compared
to the August-November time window. However, for the other clubs, the level of hedging after
planting time does not change significantly based on the season.  This does not imply that clubs
do not change their behavior after May, only that they do not change their hedging in a
systematic fashion after May. If clubs change their forward pricing behavior based on
expectations, this could lead to different hedging levels across years and within a year.
To investigate whether clubs are responding to information and expectations, we estimate
a second model of the form:
(2) kt kt 3 kt 2 kt 1 k k 0 kt e FP RP TP M H + + + + + = ￿ a a a b a
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where the variables TP, RP and FP are used to measure how farmer pricing is influenced by
relative prices. Specifically, TP is a dummy variable that measures the price trend using a 20-day
moving average of past prices. If the current price is above the moving average then the trend is
higher and the dummy variable takes a value of 1. If farmers are trend followers, as is the case of
technical analysis, then we would expect a higher trend to be associated with less hedging. The
variable RP measures the current price relative to the previous year’s high price. This represents
the extent to which the current year's price is relatively high or low compared to last year. If13
farmers tend to make forward pricing decisions relative to last year’s prices, we would expect
this variable to be significant although the sign of the variable is unclear. For example, if farmers
have adaptive expectations then a high current price relative to last year would imply greater
hedging. On the other hand, if farmers use current prices as the basis for forming expectations,
then high current prices relative to last year may signal higher prices down the road and less
hedging. The third variable, FP, is the current price less the fundamental price based on the
monthly USDA-WASDE supply and demand report. The fundamental price is a forecast of the
December futures price from a model using the stocks-to-use ratio. As USDA makes monthly
revisions to their supply and demand estimates this price forecast changes to reflect the new
fundamental value. A positive value for FP indicates that the current price is above the
fundamental price. The exact procedure for estimating the fundamental price is given in the
appendix. If farmers make pricing decisions based on market fundamentals, then we would
expect them to forward price more when FP is positive.
The estimates for equation (2) are presented in table 4. All clubs show some tendency to
hedge less when the price trend is positive as indicated by the negative coefficient on the trend
dummy variable (TP). However, only two clubs have a statistically significant coefficient at the 5
percent level. Based on the parameter estimate for TP, clubs tend to hedge 3 to 23 percent less of
their entire crop during a higher trending market. As for the relative price, two of the clubs tend
to hedge significantly less when the current price is higher relative to last year's high price while
one club hedges significantly more.  Finally, for the fundamental price measure, the results are
also mixed with two clubs hedging significantly more when prices are high compared to the
fundamental value and two clubs hedging significantly less.14
From these results, it seems that farmers change their forward pricing behavior as market
conditions change. Across all clubs, trend following seems to be the most consistent theme as
higher trending prices lead to less hedging.  In terms of expectations, there seems to be no
universal way that farmers as a group form their price outlook. However, there does appear to be
a consistent tendency by the clubs to hedge more when prices are relatively low, either in
comparison to last year or in reference to a fundamental value. For example, if the variables FP
and RP are both –10 cents per bushel, implying that the current price is 10 cents below the
fundamental value and the high from last year, then 4 of the 6 clubs would tend to hedge more (a
range of 1 to 4 percent).  The remaining two clubs would hedge less, with Talbot county hedging
2 percent less and Washington county 8 percent less. Given that the majority of farmers tend to
hedge more during low prices periods suggests that farmers use current prices as a gauge for the
market outlook. Simply stated, it may be that farmers use low prices as a signal that prices will
continue to move lower and forward pricing is warranted. Likewise, during periods of high
prices farmers tend to hedge less, possibly in anticipation of better prices to come. In terms of
expectations, it is difficult to quantify how farmers form their price outlook. However, our
attempt to develop a fundamental value based on market supply and demand suggests that most
of the clubs had no significant response or had a significantly negative response implying less
hedging when prices were overvalued relative to the fundamental price. However, it is
encouraging that Washington county, which showed the greatest positive response to the
fundamental value, achieved the highest net-profits from their forward pricing strategies over the
5-year period.
Conclusions15
The analysis in this paper provides support for the positions of both the research and
extension marketing views in the current debate on the correct hedging position for farmers.
Farmers participating in the marketing clubs did not consistently profit from their forward
pricing decisions as the efficient market hypothesis and standard hedging theory would suggest.
However, hedging activity was not consistent with the implications of standard hedging theory
on a number of dimensions. First, farmers tend to forward price significantly less than what
would be dictated by purely risk-minimizing behavior. Even so, there appears to be considerable
variation in the amount hedged across marketing years indicating that farmers may be attempting
to time the market, although their ability to do so seems limited.
The majority of the clubs seem to be trend followers and use relative prices as a signal of
future price direction. Fundamental information, as measured by this study, seems to have little
influence on pricing decisions, although one club did appear to positively use fundamental
information to make successful pricing decisions.
Even through farmers may not respond exactly as would be expected from the hedging
literature, it is comforting that farmers are achieving the results of reducing risk. The results,
however, confirm a needed change in the hedging literature away from pure risk-minimizing
behavior to strategies that are consistent with risk reduction and expectations.
At the same time, it appears that extension marketing efforts needed to be redirected to
helping farmers form better expectations in light of market information. Farmers appear to use
prices as a signal of the market outlook, but they seem to have limited ability to respond to
market information. Gains could be made by having extension programs that aid farmers in
analyzing and interpreting market information in an attempt to achieve better price expectations.16
APPENDIX
Every month USDA releases their projections of the annual supply and demand for
commodities in the World Agricultural Supply and Demand (WASDE) report. These reports are
widely followed by commodity traders. Projections for ending stocks are perhaps the single most
important projection because it measures the surplus from the current year to be carried forward
to the next crop year (Purcell and Koontz).  A common way to develop a price forecast is to use
the ending stocks as a percent of total use as an explanatory variable. Therefore, we constructed
an ex ante forecast of the December futures price in November based on the latest USDA
estimate of the ending stocks-to-use ratio (SUR). The model is of the form:
b
t t ) a(SUR F =
where Ft is the December corn futures price in mid-November and SUR is the stocks-to-use ratio
from the November WASDE report. This model captures the essence of a storable commodity
market where prices increase proportionally more at low stock levels as compared to high stock
levels.
To develop the estimates for a and b, the previous seven years of data for the SUR
estimate in November and the December corn futures price in November are used. This model
was then used to forecast the December futures price based on USDA's estimate of the SUR for
the current marketing year. The difference between the current December futures price and the
forecasted price is the variable FP in equation (2). At the start of a new marketing year, the
model is re-estimated using the most recent seven years of data. The choice of seven years of
data is based on the need to develop a simple predictive model that responds more rapidly to
current conditions. For the five years from 1994-1998, the model fits relatively well with the R
2
ranging from 0.74 to 0.98 and the parameter estimates are reasonably stable. For example, at a17
SUR value of 10%, the price projections range from a low of $2.81 per bushel in 1995 to a high
of $2.91 per bushel in 1997.18
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Producers." Review of Agricultural Economics, 20(1998): 308-331.Table 1.  Maryland Grain Marketing Clubs Participating in the Model Farm.
Club Name Years Participating
Carroll County 1994, 1995, 1996
Harford County 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998
Kent County 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
Talbot County 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
Washington County 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
Worcester County 1995, 1996, 199721





Change in Dec. Futures
(Cents/Bu.)
a
1994 21.0 5 38.5
1995 -26.2 6 -74.0
1996 27.9 6 95.3
1997 -0.6 4 -20.0
1998 30.3 3 42.5
1994-98 10.5 16.5
aDefined as the December futures price in May (planting) less the December futures price in November (harvest).22
Table 3. Seasonal Model for Proportion Forward Priced By Marketing Clubs.
All
Clubs





















May-Jul Dummy -0.073 -0.074 -0.069 -0.060 -0.199
* -0.005 0.032

























*Indicates significance at the 5% level.23
Table 4. Proportion Priced By Marketing Clubs Based on Relative Prices.
All
Clubs

























* -0.194 -0.073 -0.027 -0.103 -0.233
* -0.071
*











*Indicates significance at the 5% level.24
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Month
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998